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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v- No. 15786 
REX GLEN FOUST, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant was convicted of the crime of incest 
in violation of Section 76-7-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
and appeals. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before an eight-person jury in 
the Second Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, 
State of Utah, before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty as charged and the defendant 
appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant seeks to have his conviction reversed 
or, in the alternative, to have this case remanded for a new 
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trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant Rex Glen Foust was charged and convicted 
of the crime of incest in violation of Section 76-7-102, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953). On November 15, 1977, the case came 
on for jury trial in the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Davis County, State of Utah, before the Honorable 
J. Duffy Palmer, presiding. 
Kathryn Foust, a witness for the State, testified 
that she met the appellant when she was eight years of age. 
(Tr. 5.) Kathryn Foust was legally adopted by the appellant 
when she was eight years old. (Tr. 5.) 
The witness further testified that she was sixteen 
years of age when the alleged crime of incest took place. 
(Tr. 4.) Her testimony leading up to the alleged crime showed 
that she desired to go to a school Christmas dance (Tr. 7); 
and that Kathryn's mother said she would have to ask her step-
father, the appellant, for his permission to attend the dance. 
(Tr. 7.) 
On the date of the alleged incident, December 1976, 
she questioned the appellant about going to the dance. (Tr· 8.' 
There was no one else in the house at the time. (Tr. 8.) The 
witness testified that on two separate occasions, that same 
afternoon, the appellant fondled her breasts. (Tr. 9, 10.) 
When she asked if she could go to the dance, the appellant 
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responded by asking if she wanted "to play." (Tr. 11.) 
The following testimony of Kathryn Foust is taken 
from the transcript: 
I figured I wanted to go to 
the girls' dance so I consented. 
(Tr. 11.) 
On cross-examination she testified: 
I wanted to go to the dance so 
I decided to have relations. 
(Tr. 17.) 
The witness and the appellant allegedly went to his 
bedroom and had sex. (Tr. 12.) Consequently, she was per-
_,. 
mitted to go to the school dance. (Tr. 14.) 
Kathryn Foust's testimony was the only evidence 
offered by the State to establish that the appellant committed 
the alleged crime. No other evidence was offered to corrobo-
rate her testimony. At the conclusion of her testimony, the 
State rested its case. (Tr. 18.) 
Defense counsel moved to dismiss the complaint on 
the grounds of insufficient evidence. (Tr. 19.) Counsel 
argued that Kathryn Foust was over the age of fourteen and 
consented to the act (Tr. 19); and that she was therefore an 
accomplice to the alleged offense. (Tr. 19.) As an accom-
plice, it was argued, her testimony must be corroborated to 
sustain th.e. conviction. (Tr. 19.) 
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The Court denied counsel's motion to dismiss. (Tr. 
19.) The judge concluded that a person must be eighteen years 
or older to be an accomplice by statute (Tr. 19, 20) and en-
tered a judgment of guilty. 
ARGUMENT 
THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF A MINOR, 
AGE SIXTEEN AT THE TIME OF THE ALLEGED 
OFFENSE, WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
CONVICT THE APPELLANT OF INCEST, WHEN 
THE MINOR VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY 
PARTICIPATED IN THE UNLAWFUL ACT. 
A. The testimony of an accomplice 
must be corroborated in order to 
sustain a conviction. 
The testimony of an accomplice is, as a matter of 
law, insufficient to sustain a conviction unless it is corrobo 
rated by other competent evidence. Section 77-31-18, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) provides: 
Conviction on testimony of accom-
plice. --A conviction shall not be 
had on the testimony of an accom-
plice, unless he is corroborated 
by other evidence, which in itself 
and without the aid of the testi-
mony of the accomplice tends to 
connect the defendant with the 
conunission of the offense; and the 
corroboration shall not be suffi-
cient, if it merely shows the 
conunission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof. 
Section 77-31-18 supplements the policy that testimony of an 
accomplice shall be regarded with distrust by barring a 
-4-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
conviction of a defendant based solely upon the uncorrobo-
rated testimony of an accomplice, even though such testimony 
of an accomplice may convince the jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The requirement of Section 77-31-18 is in addition to 
the requirement of the doctrine of reasonable doubt; it in 
effect says that even though the jury is convinced to a moral 
certainty that the defendant is guilty, it still must acquit 
him if the testimony of the accomplice is uncorroborated. 
B. A minor, age sixteen, who volun-
tarily and knowingly participates 
in an act of incest is an accom-
plice to the crime whose testi-
mony must be corroborated to 
sustain a conviction. 
This court has set up a two-prong test to determine 
if a party to a criminal act is an accomplice. The first 
requirement before one can be held to be an accomplice is that 
the party voluntarily and knowingly united with another in the 
commission of a criminal act. State v. Georgopoulos, 492 P.2d 
1353 (Utah 1972); State v. Helm, 563 P.2d 794 (Utah 1977). 
The second requirement is that the party could have been 
prosecuted for the identical offense charged the defendant on 
trial. State v. Fertig, 233 P.2d 347 (Utah 1951); State v. 
Georgopoulos, supra. Generally, the question of whether or 
not the alleged accomplice possessed the requisite mental 
state is a question for the jury, while the second requirement 
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is a question of law for the judge. State v. Fertig, supra. 
The aforementioned allocation of duties between the jury and 
the judge is modified only when the alleged accomplice is, 
as a matter of law, deemed incapable of possessing the requi-
site mental state. 
In Utah a person under the age of fourteen is, as a 
matter of law, incapable of being an accomplice to any crimi-
nal act because those persons less than fourteen years old 
are not criminally responsible for their conduct. Section 
76-2-301, Utah Code Annotated (1953) provides: 
A person is not criminally respon-
sible for conduct performed before 
he reaches the age of fourteen 
years. 
Likewise, Section 76-5-406, Utah Code Annotated (1953) speci-
fies that a person under fourteen years of age is incapable of 
consenting to an act of sexual intercourse, sodomy, or sexual 
abuse which thereby precludes those under fourteen from pos-
sessing the requisite mental state to be deemed to be an 
accomplice. 
Conversely, those minors fourteen years old and 
older are deemed capable of having the mental capacity to con· 
sent to and commit crimes for which they are criminally accoun: 
able. 
In addition to the above statutes, which deal 
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directly with criminal responsibility and consent, Section 
76-5-401, Utah Code Annotated (1953), Unlawful Sexual Inter-
course, indirectly deals with the age at which minors are 
deemed capable of assenting to sexual acts. It provides: 
(1) A male person commits unlaw-
ful sexual intercourse if he has 
sexual intercourse with a female, 
not his wife, who is under sixteen 
years of age. (Emphasis added.) 
The clear import of the Criminal Code, when con-
sidered in its entirety, is that a minor, at the age of six-
teen, can voluntarily and knowingly participate in a criminal 
act and is capable of consenting to those acts. By virtue of 
Section 76-2-301 and Section 76-5-406, there appears to be no 
legal bar to a finding that a person fourteen years or older 
is an accomplice. Absent such a legal bar, the question of 
whether or not a minor voluntarily and knowingly participated 
in the criminal act is a question for the jury. State v. 
Fertig, supra. Logically, if one can be held criminally 
responsible for an act, he can also be an accomplice thereto, 
and there can be no doubt that if a minor is found to be an 
accomplice then Section 77-31-18 requiring corroboration would 
apply. 
Assuming, arguendo, that a minor, age sixteen, is 
capable of possessing a requisite mental state to be held to 
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be an accomplice by the jury, the judge must then deal with 
the second prong of the test laid down by this court; i.e., 
that the accomplice could be charged with the identical of-
fense which the defendant at trial is accused. 
The statute governing the charging of juvenile pro-
vides that in the case of all felonies, a minor can be, if 
the State so desires, be charged as an adult under the Crimi-
nal Code. Section 55-10-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953) pro-
vides as follows: 
Felony committed by child--
Hearing and certification to 
district court.--If the petition 
in the case of a person fourteen 
years of age or older alleges 
that he committed an act which 
would constitute a felony if 
committed by an adult, and if 
the court after full investiga-
tion and a hearing finds that it 
would be contrary to the best 
interests of the child or of the 
public to retain jurisdiction, 
the court may enter an order 
certifying to that effect and 
directing that the child be held 
for criminal proceedings in the 
district court, with a hearing 
before a committing magistrate 
to be held as in other felony 
cases. The provisions of section 
55-10-96 and other provisions 
relating to proceedings in 
children's cases shall, to the 
extent they are pertinent, be 
applicable to the hearing held 
under this section. 
When a criminal complaint is 
filed in a court of competent 
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jurisdiction charging the child 
with the offense certified under 
this section, the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile court is terminated 
as to the child or person con-
cerned. 
The fact that minors are not ordinarily prosecuted 
in the criminal courts in our society today does not detract 
from the fact that minors could be accused of the same offense 
for which a principal is charged under the aforecited statute. 
In view of the fact that incest in violation of 
Section 76-6-102, Utah Code Annotated (1953) is a third degree 
felony, and therefore a crime which a minor could be charged 
with under Section 55-10-86, Utah Code Annotated (1953) as an 
adult, the second prong of the applicable test has been met. 
Unlike the crimes such as "carnal knowledge," 
"statutory rape," or "contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor," both parties to an act of incest, assuming the requi-
site legal age and mental state, could be charged with the 
identical crime. 
This court has not directly ruled on the application 
of Section 77-31-18, Utah Code Annotated (1953) (corrobora-
tion) to a charge of incest under Section 76-7-102, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953) where the complaining witness was a minor, 
age sixteen. However, this court dealt with the general issue 
of the need for corroboration in a similar case, State v. 
~. 308 P.2d 264 (Utah 1957). In Clawson the defendant 
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was convicted of sodomy based on the sole uncorroborated tes:; 
mony of the prosecutrix. This court reversed the conviction, 
holding that it was error on the part of the trial court to 
have refused the requested instruction concerning the need 
for corroboration. See also State v. Thompson, 87 P. 709 
(Utah 1906); State v. Kimball, 146 P. 313 (Utah 1915) which 
required corroboration in adultery cases; and State v. Huntsmo· 
204 P.2d 448 (Utah 1949) which held that under the prior 
criminal code corroboration was not necessary in a case in-
volving "carnal knowledge." 
Numerous other jurisdictions have considered the 
more specific issue of whether corroboration is required where 
a minor voluntarily participates in an unlawful sexual act 
with an adult and the minor is later the complaining witness. 
Those jurisdictions which have considered the issue have 
almost uniformly held that corroboration is necessary in order 
to sustain the conviction. 19 A.L.R.2d §§ 9 & 21, Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence 13th ed., Vol. 3 § 647. 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Motherly v. State, 
71 P.2d 1094 (Okla. 1937) dealt with an almost identical fact 
situation as is presented by this appeal. In that case the 
defendant was convicted of incest based on the testimony of 
his daughter that he had had sexual relations with her over a 
period of years from the time she was fourteen until she was 
twenty. The.~aughter was the only witness presented by the 
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State on direct examination. The Oklahoma Supreme Court 
reversed the defendant's conviction holding: 
We believe that under the facts 
in this case the court should 
have determined as a matter of 
law, the question as to whether 
or not the evidence show that 
prosecutrix had voluntarily 
committed the act and should 
have told the jury that under 
such testimony she was an 
accomplice and it was necessary 
for her testimony to be corrobo-
rated. 
More recently the California Supreme Court dealt with this 
issue. In People v. Cox, 227 P.2d 290 (Calif. 1951) the 
defendant was charged and convicted with the crime of sodomy; .. 
The two complaining witnesses were both boys age fourteen. 
The evidence established that the boys voluntarily partici-
pated in the offense. The trial court ruled the boys were 
not accomplices and therefore their testimony did not need to 
be corroborated in order to convict. The Supreme Court of 
Ca.lifornia reversed, holding that, "since the prosecuting 
witnesses were of the age of fourteen years, they were capable 
of committing a crime, and since they knowingly, freely and 
voluntarily participated in acts prohibited by section 288a 
of the Penal Code, they were subject to prosecution for vio-
lating such section, the identical offense for which defendant 
was on trial. Therefore they were accomplices and their tes-
timony, in .. s:irder to sustain a conviction of defendant, must 
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have been corroborated in accordance with section 1111 of the 
Penal Code." 
A review of the more recent cases shows widespread 
acceptance of the proposition that the testimony of a minor 
who voluntarily and knowingly participates in an illicit sexu0 
act is an accomplice to the act and therefore the minor's 
testimony must be corroborated to sustain a conviction. State 
v. Howard, 400 P.2d 332 (Ariz. 1965), fifteen-year-old girl 
held to be an accomplice to lewd and lscivious act; People v. 
McRae, 187 P.2d 741 (Calif. 1947), cert. denied, 68 S. Ct. 
1511, 334 U.S. 843, 92 L. Ed. 1967, 15-year-old boy was an 
accomplice in sexual offense per J. Traynor; People v. Cox, 
227 P. 290, 102 C.A.2d 285 (1951), two fourteen-year-old boys 
held to be accomplices to act of sodomy whose testimony in 
order to sustain the conviction had to be corroborated; Woodv 
v. State, 238 P.2d 367 (Okla. 1951), fifteen-year-old boy heLl 
to be an accomplice to voluntary sex acts. See also Wharton's 
Criminal Evidence, 13th ed., Vol. 3, § 647. 
C. The trial court erroneously ruled 
that the complaining witness 
could not legally be an accomplice 
to incest and thereby improperly 
refused to either instruct the jury on the need for corroboration 
or alternatively to dismiss the 
complaint. 
The relevant testimony elicited from the prosecu-
trix at trial was that she was sixteen years old on the day 
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of the alleged offense (Tr. 4) and that she voluntarily had 
sexual relations with the defendant in order to gain permis-
sion to go to a school dance. (Tr. 11.) The voluntariness 
of the witness's actions is demonstrated by the following 
excerpts from the transcript: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
WITNESS KATHRYN FOUST: I figured 
that I wanted to go to the girls' 
dance so I consented. (Tr. 11.) 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
WITNESS KATHRYN FOUST: Yes, but 
that isn't really the situation 
that you described. I wanted to 
go to the dance so I decided to 
have relations. (Tr. 17.) 
No evidence was presented by the State to establish 
that the witness was coerced in any way to participate in the 
alleged act. There can be no doubt that the testimony of the 
prosecutrix was uncorroborated as she was the sole witness 
for the State in its case in chief. Subsequent to the State 
resting, defense counsel moved to dismiss the conplaint on the 
grounds of insufficient evidence, submitting to the court that 
the witness was an accomplice to the act of incest whose 
testimony needed to be corroborated. (Tr. 19.) The Court 
denied the motion and responded as follows: 
COURT: Eighteen and over is an 
accomplice, by the statute. (Tr. 
19.) 
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At the close of the trial, but prior to the jury 
being instructed, counsel requested the following two instruc-
tions: 
No. 5. You are instructed that 
any person over fourteen years 
of age is criminally responsible 
for his conduct. Therefore, any 
person over the age of fourteen 
who willingly participates in a 
criminal act is an accomplice to 
the crime committed. 
No. 6. You are instructed that 
a conviction shall not be had on 
the testimony of an accomplice, 
unless she is corroborated by 
other evidence, which in itself 
and without the aid of the testi-
mony of the accomplice tends to 
connect the defendant with the 
commission of the offense; and 
corroboration shall not be suffi-
cient, if it merely shows the 
commission of the offense or the 
circumstances thereof. 
The test of sufficiency of 
corroborative evidence is that it 
need not be sufficient in itself 
to support a conviction, but it 
must implicate the accused in 
the offense, and not be consistent 
with his innocence, unless it will 
do more than cast a grave sus-
picion on the accused. 
Once again the trial court refused to give the in-
structions (Tr. 45) and ruled as follows: 
It is the opinion of the court 
that the age of consent, if at 
all, in incest would be at the 
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age of eighteen wherein she 
becomes an adult and that the 
pressure of the father would 
indicate whether or not it was 
free will consent. (Tr. 45.) 
The trial court clearly committed prejudicial error 
in refusing to either instruct the jury on the applicable law 
of accomplice and the need for corroboration so that the jury 
could determine whether the prosecutrix had the requisite 
mental state to be an accomplice or, in the alternative, to 
declare as a matter of law, based on the undisputed testimony 
of the consent of the prosecutrix, that she was an ac~omplice 
and that inasmuch as her testimony was uncorroborated, the 
complaint would be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
./' 
There can be little doubt that the prosecutrix, being 
age sixteen at the time of the alleged unlawful act, was 
criminally responsible for her actions, assuming the requisite 
mental state, by virtue of Section 76-2-301, Utah Code Anno-
tated (1953). Likewise, inasmuch as the act committed was 
incest, a felony in violation of Section 76-6-102, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953), the prosecutrix could have been charged with 
the identical offense of incest as the appellant was brought 
to trial on. As such, the prosecutrix in the case at bar was 
legally capable of being an accomplice to the crime of incest. 
The question which remained at the time the State completed 
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its case, and again after defense counsel had rested, was 
whether or not the prosecutrix was factually an accomplice to 
the alleged criminal act. The judge thereupon committed pre-
judicial error by either failing to instruct the jury on the 
requirements necessary to find the prosecutrix an accomplice 
and the incumbent requirement of corroboration of her testi-
mony in order to sustain the conviction or in failing as a 
matter of law to find the prosecutrix was an accomplice and 
thereby dismiss the complaint as her testimony was uncorrobo-
rated. 
Wherefore, the appellant respectfully prays that his 
conviction be reversed as a matter of law based on the undis-
puted fact that the prosecutrix consented to the unlawful act 
and that her testimony was uncorroborated or, in the alterna-
tive, reverse and remand this case for a new trial with the 
instruction to the trial court that the jury must be instructec 
on the applicable law with regard to accomplices and the need 
for corroboration in order to sustain the conviction of the 
appellant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSEN AND HANSEN 
250 East Broadway, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appell~t 
---~-
- I -By ~-- --~ 
~~ Phil L. Hansen 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Brief of Apel-
lant was served on counsel for the respondent by delivering 
two copies thereof to the Office of the Attorney General, 236 
State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and by mailing two 
copies thereof to Steven C. Vanderlinden, Deputy County 
Attorney, Davis County Courthouse, Farmington, Utah 84025, in 
a postage prepaid envelope on the \1~ day of July, 
1978. 
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